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Grant Gilmore and the Illusion of
Certainty*
Ellen A. Peterst
There is, to my mind, no way to put into words the abysmal loss that I
feel, that we all share, now that Grant Gilmore is no longer with us. I
cannot eloquently address that loss, and so I will not try. Instead, let me
recount some happier recollections of better days-of Grant Gilmore as a
teacher and a scholar, a colleague and a friend.
In the fall of 1952, exactly thirty years ago, I was a second year student
at this law school and a member of Grant Gilmore's class in commercial
law. I believe the class met in the room that I still think of as room 114. I
recall having the good fortune to be seated somewhat to the left of center,
so that when Grant swung around in his chair as he addressed the class, I
had a fair chance of catching at least the middle and almost invariably the
end of the questions that were being put to us. Our agenda was the devel-
opment of commercial law, principally under the then still extant Uni-
form Sales Act.' As Grant Gilmore's questions unfolded, each more pene-
trating and less answerable than its immediate predecessor, the class
learned, painfully, to abandon its last vestiges of hope for certainty in the
law. The next year a student borrowed my commercial law notes from
that fall, only to return the notes the following day, in high dudgeon; they
contained nothing but questions, interminable questions. The borrower
was, of course, right; the notes were, however, accurate.
A student's first response to a Gilmore class was excitement, exhilara-
tion at a masterful demonstration of the Socratic method and of legal real-
ism-but that was only the first response. The enduring message was that
abandonment of the illusion of certainty did not signal nihilism, or anar-
chy, or anti-intellectualism. On the contrary, we learned, as Grant wrote
the following year in his celebrated article on good faith purchase, that
"[t]he only legal certainty is the certainty of legal change."'
In all his teaching, and in his scholarly work in commercial law, Grant
* Delivered at the Yale Law School memorial service for Grant Gilmore, Oct. 3, 1982.
t Associate Justice, Connecticut Supreme Court; Professor (Adjunct) of Law, Yale University.
1. The Uniform Commercial Code, which superseded the Uniform Sales Act, became effective in
Pennsylvania in 1954; however, in large part because of concerns raised by a New York study com-
mission, other states did not adopt the Code until the 1960's, after the promulgation of further amend-
ments to the official text of the Code. See AMERICAN LAW INST., UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE at xv-
xvi (9th ed. 1978) (general comment).
2. Gilmore, The Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 63 YALE L.J. 1057, 1121 (1954).
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Gilmore frequently reverted to this theme, to the illusion of certainty. In
the concluding paragraphs of The Death of Contract he wrote of the re-
current pressures alternatively to formulate and then to annihilate "neat,
tidy, and logical" theories of law.3 In the final chapter of The Ages of
American Law he described the illusion of certainty as a curse dictated by
the fallacious assumption that law is, or could be made into, a science. "If
we can rid ourselves," he wrote, "of the illusion that law is some kind of
science-natural, social, or pseudo-and of the twin illusion that the pur-
pose of law study is prediction, we shall be better off than we have been
for at least a hundred years."4 In his last public statement, the commence-
ment address given last May at the University of Connecticut School of
Law, he noted that "if it were possible for judges and legislators to
achieve absolute clarity in their opinions and statutes, the process of ad-
justing our rules to reflect changing circumstances would be even more
difficult than it now is."' And: "What makes law, its study and practice,
qualitatively unlike most other things that human beings do is that we can
never be sure of anything."8
Grant Gilmore's commitment to the idea that certainty is illusory was
not merely a commitment of theory. His writings in commercial law re-
veal of course a searching mind probing always for flexible solutions to
problems perceived to be doctrinally intractable. More importantly, the
solutions that seemed acceptable after long and serious study could subse-
quently be found wanting after further inquiry and further reflection.
How few of us, having put pen to paper, retain an open mind! We may
talk of "first approximations" and "tentative proposals," but we rarely
retain the ability to reexamine our finished manuscripts or our final opin-
ions. Grant could, and did. Nothing was ever intellectually settled. He
could never understand the concern that anyone's writing could preempt
further effort in the same field, since, in his view, learning could only be
enriched by further searching dialogue.
In the preface to Security Interests in Personal Property,7 which he
wrote in 1965, he cheerfully acknowledged that he himself was the drafts-
man of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, the shortcomings of
which his treatise would frequently lament. It was, he wrote, "a sobering
experience for any draftsman to revisit, in later life, the scene of his
youthful crimes." 8 Still, in 1965, these so-called youthful crimes were at
most on the order of misdemeanors, sins of omission rather than of com-
3. G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 102 (1974).
4. G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 101 (1977).
5. Gilmore, What is a Law School?, 15 CONN. L. REV. 1, 2 (1982).
6. Id. at 3.
7. G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY (1965).
8. 1 id. at x.
The Yale Law Journal
mission, largely attributable to the invariable time lag between scholarly
drafting and legislative enactment.
In more recent years, Grant's reexamination of his earlier work was
more profound and hence more startling. He began to question the wis-
dom and the methodology of codifying commercial law, despite his earlier
advocacy of the Uniform Commercial Code. "Codification," he wrote in
1979, serves principally "to preserve the past, like a fly in amber."9 In his
last major article, he trenchantly reviewed the law of good faith purchase,
concluding, in 1981, that his own earlier scholarly work and drafting ef-
forts had proceeded from perceptions of commercial reality that had been
"in large part (although not entirely) mistaken."10 What he now found,
upon reflection, to be the most successful features of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code were the opportunities for maneuver within its confines, op-
portunities created on the one hand by inadvertent inconsistencies and on
the other hand by reliance on overriding principles such as good faith,
unconscionability, and commercial reasonableness.1 No one can harbor
the thought that a Code with such virtues will foster mistaken illusions of
certainty.
Grant Gilmore's view of certainty as an illusion had an important car-
ryover for his relationships with his colleagues. Unfailingly a kind and
responsive critic, he was especially warm in his encouragement of junior
colleagues, wherever they might be. He read widely, and not only the
Yale Law Journal and the Harvard Law Review, he generously and en-
thusiastically supported scholarly enterprise in all its myriad shapes. In
my own case, his wise counsel greatly helped to sustain my intellectual
endeavors, both in the good days when I had a plausible but often under-
developed idea for commentary on the Uniform Commercial Code, and in
the bad days when I had to accept delay in my promotion to tenure. At
that time, when women were a rarity on law faculties, and their need for
mentors was as yet unarticulated, Grant's unstinting support provided
confidence that success in the academy was possible and assurance that
such success was a long term goal worthy of pursuit, no matter what the
intermediate obstacles might be.
In recent years, Grant retired to teach at the University of Vermont12
9. Gilmore, Formalism and the Law of Negotiable Instruments, 13 CREIGHTON L. REV. 441, 461
(1979).
10. Gilmore, The Good Faith Purchase Idea and the Uniform Commercial Code: Confessions of
a Repentant Draftsman, 15 GA. L. REV. 605, 605 (1981).
11. Id. at 628-29. A similar theme was explored in an article written as part of the Yale Law
Journal issue that honored Grant Gilmore at the time of his retirement. See Jackson & Peters, Quest
for Uncertainty: A Proposal for Flexible Resolution of Inherent Conflicts Between Article 2 and
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 87 YALE L.J. 907 (1978).
12. Upon his retirement, the Yale Law Journal dedicated its April 1978 issue to Grant Gilmore.
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and I went on the bench, so that, unfortunately, our contacts became more
intermittent. Let me close with an excerpt from our last exchange of let-
ters, two years ago. I had sent Grant a copy of an opinion I had written
for the court in a case involving a reluctant buyer of real property, who,
having breached his contract of purchase, sought to recover his down pay-
ment. 13 What made the buyer's argument appealing, and persuasive to the
trial court, was the fact that, after the buyer's breach, the value of the real
estate had soared. The seller, having retained the property, was thus ar-
guably benefitted by the buyer's breach and unjustly enriched by keeping
the down payment in addition. We rejected this appealing argument, rea-
soning that the buyer was imposing the wrong time frame on the mea-
surement of benefit: since the seller's injury arose at the time of the
buyer's breach, so his benefit had to be measured at that same time. Grant
wrote back, after noting how fascinating a problem the case had
presented: "I appreciate the logic of your position. And yet I wonder
whether the trial judge may not have blundered into a sort of truth (judi-
cial ignorance is the greatest of law reformers). No doubt the economists
would have an answer ready-made." I shall always treasure the comment
as quintessentially Grant's, and I still wonder which answer is right.
There is no one else with whom I can hope to have such an exchange
in the future. But Grant's memory serves as a constant reminder to guard
against the illusion of certainty, to avoid, as misleading and wrong, any
attempt to describe the broad exercise of judgment in abstract generaliza-
tions borrowed from the terminology of formal logic14 or of economic the-
ory. It is a memory to be cherished.
13. Vines v. Orchard Hills, Inc., 181 Conn. 501, 435 A.2d 1022 (1980).
14. See United States v. Nelson, 419 F.2d 1237, 1245 (9th Cir. 1969).
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